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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is an appeal from the district court review of an adjudicative proceeding 
of a political subdivision of the state and the Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(b)(l). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the 1996 District Court case res judicata with respect to the issues 
presented in the 1998 District Court case brought by the Petitioners against the 
Respondent? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, and is therefore 
reviewable for correction of error. Wimgar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P. 2d 104, 107-08 
(Utah 1991). 
This issue was preserved for appeal in the memoranda and argument 
presented at the hearing of the cross motions for summary judgment (R. 17-139; 142-
246; 247-257; 258-281). 
2. Are the Petitioners entitled to non-conforming use status with respect to 
their real properties utilized as short-term rentals prior to the issuance of a cease and 
desist order by the Respondent Sandy City Corporation in 1996? 
Standard of Review: This is a challenge to a summary judgment presenting 
for review conclusions of law only and the appellate court reviews those conclusions 
for correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
This issue was preserved for appeal in the memoranda and argument 
presented at the hearing of the cross motions for summary judgment. (R. 17-139; 
142-246; 247-257; 258-281). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following provisions of law may be determinative of the issues herein, 
and are set out in their entirety in the addendum: 
Chapter 15-24 Sandy City Development Code 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by John Collins and June Collins against the Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment and Sandy City Corporation for review of a decision by the 
Sandy City Board of Adjustment denying non-conforming use status for certain real 
properties located in Sandy City owned by John and June Collins that had been 
utilized as short-term rentals prior to the enactment by Sandy City of an ordinance 
prohibiting such short-term rentals. 
On October 27, 1998 the Petitioners John and June Collins filed an 
application for non-conforming use status with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment. 
This application was denied on November 12, 1998. The Petitioners filed a Petition 
for Review on December 11, 1998. (R. 1-6) Cross motions for summary judgment 
were subsequently filed (R. 15-16; 140-141) and the Motions were argued on August 
16,1999. (R. 431) 
The District Court granted the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denied the Petitioners' Motion. (R. 446-448; Add. 1-3 ) Petitioners filed this appeal 
on December 16,1999. (R. 449-450 ). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioners are the owners of certain real properties located within the 
boundaries of Sandy City. For a lengthy period of time prior to March, 1996, the 
Petitioners utilized the properties as short-term rental properties, sometimes referred 
to as "ski rentals". In March, 1996 the respondent Sandy City Corporation issued a 
cease and desist order requiring the petitioners to cease using the properties for that 
purpose. (R. 28 ) Sandy City did not at that time pass an ordinance prohibiting 
short-term rentals but relied instead on the existing ordinance, arguing that such use 
was already prohibited. 
The Petitioners filed an appeal to the respondent Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment in 1996, which upheld Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy zoning 
ordinances to preclude such use by the petitioners. Petitioners appealed that decision 
to the Third District Court and the District Court upheld the decision of the Sandy 
City Board of Adjustment. [Third District Court Case No. 960905929CV] (R. 210) 
On March 26, 1998 the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision in a case 
involving precisely the same issues as those presented by the Petitioners herein in the 
above-referenced 1996 case which was pending at the same time as the petitioners' 
case, in Brown, et. al. vs. Sandy City Board of Adjustment; and Sandy, a political subdivision of 
Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998). That case, decided March 26, 1998, held that 
Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy City Development Code to prohibit leases of 
less than thirty days in residential zones was not a correct interpretation, i.e., Sandy 
City had no valid ordinance prohibiting short-term leases in Sandy City. The 
respondent Sandy City then imposed a temporary moratorium on short-term rentals 
effective March 27, 1998 and subsequently enacted ordinances prohibiting short-term 
leases. (R. 36-45) 
On or about October 27, 1998, the petitioners filed an application for 
determination of non-conforming status on their properties with the Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment. (R. 50) That application was heard by the Board on 
November 12, 1998. The Sandy City Board of Adjustment denied the petitioners' 
application for determination of non-conforming use status on the petitioners' 
properties, apparently relying on the 1996 District Court decision which denied the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by John and June Collins and granted the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sandy City Corporation. (R. 446-448) 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of that decision in Case No. 980912601 in the 
Third District Court. On cross motions for summary judgment the District Court 
ruled that because the Petitioners/Appellants had not appealed the prior order in 
Third District Court Case No. 960905929CV, that case was res judicata in the present 
case (Case No. 980912601) and precluded the Petitioners/Appellants from obtaining 
non-conforming use status on the subject properties. The District Court further 
ruled that the Petitioners had not demonstrated that they were in fact using the 
subject properties as short-term rentals on the date that Sandy City7 enacted its 
ordinance prohibiting such use. (R 446-448; Add. 1-3 ). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The decision of the District Court in the 1996 case does not constitute a 
bar under principles of res judicata with respect to the Petitioners' application for non-
conforming use status because the issues involved in the 1996 case and the 1998 case 
are not identical, and there was an intervening change in the law that occurred when 
the Court of Appeals decided Brown, et. al vs. Sandy City Board of Adjustment; and Sandy, 
a political subdivision of Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998). This case became the 
controlling law of the case and effectively established that Sandy City Corporation 
had no valid ordinance prohibiting short-term rental properties when it issued a cease 
and desist order requiring the Petitioners to terminate using their real properties 
located in Sandy City for such purpose. 
2. The Petitioners are entitled to non-conforming use status for the properties 
owned by them in Sandy City and used as short-term rentals prior to the date of the 
cease and desist order issued by Sandy City Corporation, regardless of the fact that 
they were not using those properties as short-term rentals on the date Sandy City 
enacted a moratorium or ordinance prohibiting such use. Mr. and Mrs. Collins 
complied with the cease and desist order in good faith and should not be penalized 
for not violating that order. 
i 
ARGUMENT 
A summary judgment may be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the judgment, this Court must "accept the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party" and "may reconsider the 
trial court's legal conclusions." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 
1991). 
POINT I: THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE 
1996 CASE IS NOT RES JUDICATA W[TH RESPECT 
TO THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONERS' 
1998 DISTRICT COURT CASE. 
A. The Issues in the 1996 Case and the 1998 Case Are Not Identical. 
The doctrine of res judicata embraces both the law of claim preclusion and the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion." In re Rights to Use of All Water, 
982 P. 2d 65 (Utah 1999); Madsen vs. Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). A party 
invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion must demonstrate that 
the issue involved is identical to the issue decided in a previous action, that the issue 
was decided in final judgment on the merits, that the issue was competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated in the first action, and that the party against whom the doctrine is 
invoked was either a party to the first action or in privity with a party to the first 
action. Hill p. Seattle First Nat. Bank, 827 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1992). If any one of these 
requirements is not satisfied, there can be no issue preclusion. Baxter v. Department of 
Tramp., 705 P.2d 1167,1168 (Utah 1985); Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P. 2d 
417,419 (Utah 1981). 
In the instant case, while the latter three requirements are met, the issue is not 
precisely the same as the issue in the 1996 case. In the 1996 case, the issue was 
whether or not the Sandy City ordinances, as then constituted, prohibited leases of 
dwellings within the boundaries of Sandy City for terms of less than thirty days. In 
the 1998 case, the issue presented was whether the Petitioners were entitled to 
recognition of non-conforming use status of their properties, based upon the fact 
that Petitioners were in fact utilizing their properties as "ski rentals" prior to the 
enactment of the Sandy City ordinance in March, 1998. These are not identical issues 
and principles of issue preclusion do not apply. 
B. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply in This Case. 
Even if the Court were to apply the principles of collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion to this case, examination of the issue does not end with the analysis set 
forth in Hill v. Seattle First Nat Bank, supra. In the case of Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift <&Loan Company, 596 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"To determine whether it is appropriate to apply collateral estoppel 
necessitates three further inquiries: First, whether the issues presented 
in the current litigation are in substance the same as resolved in the prior 
litigation; second, whether the controlling facts or legal principles have 
changed significantly since the prior judgment [emphasis added]; third, 
whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal 
rules of preclusion." At 1032. 
The analysis enunciated in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & hoan Company, 
supra, follows the general rule in the United States. In State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. 
Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "... [I]t is .. .the general rule 
that res judicata is no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the 
o 
second there has been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an 
altered situation. 2 Freeman on judgments (5th ed. 1925)." At 162. Where the facts or 
the law have substantially changed between the first judgment and the second 
judgment, collateral estoppel is inapplicable. Statler v. Catalano, 293 111. App. 3d 483, 
691 N.E.2d 384 (111. App. 1997); Community Hospital vs. Sullivan, 986 F. 2d 357, 360 
(10th Or. 1993); Board of Education vs. Village ofNorthbrook, 692 N.E. 2d 1278 (111. App. 
1 Dist. 1998); Farrow vs. Brown, 873 S.W. 2d 918 (Mo. App. 1994). 
The Respondent maintains that because the Third District Court in the 1996 
case granted summary judgment for Sandy City against John and June Collins, 
essentially ruling that there was no issue as to any material fact and that Sandy City's 
zoning ordinances, as then written, prohibited the leasing of property for terms less 
than thirty days, as argued and advanced by Sandy City, that this precludes the 
Petitioners from making application for non-conforming use status, notwithstanding 
the fact that the Utah Court of Appeals ruled in Brown, et. al. vs. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment; and Sandy, a political subdivision of Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) that 
Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy City Development Code to prohibit leases of 
less than thirty days in residential zones was erroneous and not a correct 
interpretation of that Code. What Brown effectively held was that Sandy City had no 
ordinance in effect that prohibited short-term leases, and that, therefore, such leases 
were a valid use. 
Taking the Respondent's position to its logical conclusion, this would mean 
that the ordinances in question in the Brown case and in Petitioners' 1996 case could 
in 
not be relied upon by Sandy City to preclude any other property owner in Sandy City 
from leasing their property for less than thirty days ( prior to the enactment of a legal 
ordinance prohibiting such leases), except the Petitioners in this case, because Mr. 
and Mrs. Collins chose to await the outcome of the Brown case, supra, rather than to 
appeal. This is an illogical and incongruous result, and is not supported by the case 
law. In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), the Court stated: 
"In the vast majority of cases, the stated law of a decision 
is effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even a 
decision which overrules prior law." At 835. 
In the instant case, a change in the intervening case law altered the situation 
between the time of the first suit by petitioners in 1996 and the present case, 
undertaken in 1998. Brown, supra, held that Sandy City could not prohibit short term 
rentals pursuant to general language in its then existing development code regarding 
the use of single family dwellings in residential zones in the city of Sandy. This 
altered the law with respect to John and June Collins as well as any other property 
owner living within the limits of Sandy City. In response to the decision in Brown, 
supra, Sandy City passed a moratorium on short-term leases and ultimately passed an 
ordinance prohibiting such leases within Sandy City. However, John and June Collins 
were legally entitled to use their properties as short-term rentals prior to the passing 
of that ordinance and that was the basis for their application for non-conforming use 
status in November, 1998. 
POINT II: THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO A GRANT 
OF NON-CONFORMING USE STATUS FOR THEIR 
PROPERTIES USED AS SHORT-TERM RENTALS 
PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE CEASE AND 
DESIST ORDER ISSUED BY RESPONDENT IN 
MARCH OF 1996. 
A. The Petitioners Were Using Their Properties for a Valid Use at the 
Time They Were Ordered to Discontinue Such Use by Sandy City. 
A nonconfonming land use is commonly defined as a lawful use maintained 
after the effective date of a zoning ordinance prohibiting such use in the applicable 
district. See 1 R. Anderson, American l^aw of Zoning 3d, §6.01, at 446-447 n. 2 (1986). 
The doctrine of vested nonconforming uses is based on the reluctance of courts to 
apply zoning ordinances retroactively, thus destroying vested property rights. Rotter v. 
Coconino County, 818 P. 2d 704 (Ariz. 1991). Any ordinance that eliminates 
nonconforming uses solely by virtue of its enactment is generally held 
unconstitutional as a taking of property without due process of law. O'Connor v. City 
of Moscow, 202 P. 2d 401, 403-04 (Idaho 1949); Bergford v. Clackamas County, 515 P. 2d 
1345, 1347 (Or. App. 1973); Allen v. City of Corpus Christi, 247 S.W. 2d 130 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1952 ). Because zoning ordinances "are in derogation of a property owner's 
common law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein 
restricting property uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting 
property uses should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Brown v. 
Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 957 P. 2d 207, 210 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting Patterson v. 
Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P. 2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995). Further, the 
right of a property owner to the continued existence of uses and structures which 
lawfully existed prior to the effective date of a zoning restriction is grounded in 
constitutional law. 8A McQuillin Municipal Corporations Sec. 25.180-25-180.20, at 
8-9 (3d ed. 1994) The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provide that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Therefore, due 
process principles protect a property owner from having his or her vested property 
rights interfered with, and preexisting lawful uses of property are generally considered 
to be vested rights that zoning ordinances may not abrogate. 8A McQuillan 
Municipal Corporations Sec 15.180.20, at 10. 
As a general rule, a landowner acquires no advantage from a nonconforming 
use previously enjoyed where it appears that such use was surreptitiously and 
fraudulently effected, or was unlawful at the time the zoning regulation took effect. 
Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home, Inc. v. City ofNorwalk, 347 A. 2d 637 (Conn. 1975 ); 
Dalton v. Van Dien, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 378 (N.Y. 1972 ). However, violations of law 
committed by patrons of the landowner are not chargeable to him or to his use of the 
land. Ratcliffe v. Morrison, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 831 (1952, Sup.). 
Technical irregularities or violations of non-land use related ordinances are 
irrelevant to the question of whether a property should be accorded nonconforming 
use status. Hugoe vs. Woods Cross City, 379 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1999); 
Waikiki Marketplace Investment Company vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City and County of 
Honolulu, 949 P. 2d 183 (Hawaii App. 1997); Mellow v. Board of Adjustment, 565 A. 2d 
947 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988), affd 567 A. 2d 422 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1989); City of 
Middlesboro Planning Com'n vs. Howard, 551 S.W. 2d 556 (Ky. 1977). 'Lawful use refers 
to compliance with previous zoning laws, not to the building codes or other legal 
requirements." Waikiki Marketplace Investment Company, supra, at p. 196. 
In March, 1996 the Petitioners owned and were using their properties located 
at 9255 South Maison Drive, 1875 East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South and 
1456 East Longdale Drive, in Sandy City, as short-term rentals (rentals for periods of 
time less than thirty days). The Petitioners discontinued using these properties for 
that purpose only because they were served with a Cease and Desist Order on March 
26,1996. (R. 28) 
Even though the Cease and Desist Order only purported to prohibit the use 
of three of the above-described properties (9255 South Maison Drive was not 
included in the Order), the Sandy City Board of Adjustment considered all of the 
properties when the issue was brought before it and its ruling was clearly intended to 
apply to all of the properties. (R. 269) 
The issue in the 1996 Board of Adjustment hearing was the admitted use by the 
Petitioners of the above-described properties as short-term rentals. Mr. and Mrs. 
Collins did not assert that they were not in fact using the properties for that purpose. 
Sandy City had made it very clear to Mr. and Mrs. Collins that such use would not be 
permitted in Sandy City. (R. 269) Now, however, Sandy City seeks to assert that Mr. 
and Mrs. Collins are precluded from asserting a valid non-conforming use for their 
properties because they were not actually using the properties as short-term rentals in 
1998 when, following the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Brown, supra, 
Sandy City enacted a moratorium prohibiting short-term rental properties in R-l 
zones in Sandy City. 
B. The Petitioners Are Not Required to Show That They Were Actually 
Using Their Properties as Short-Term Rentals on the Date That Sandy 
City Enacted an Ordinance Prohibiting Such Use. 
Section 15-24-2 of the Sandy City Development Code (Add. 4 -5) provides in 
pertinent part that: 
"Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or structure, 
lawfully existing at the time of the enactment or subsequent 
amendment of this Code, may be continued, even though such 
use, building, or structure does not conform with the provisions 
of this Code for the district in which it is located." . . . 
The foregoing section of the Sandy City Development Code is in conformity 
with the Utah Code sec. 10-9-408 (1996) which declares that "a nonconforming use 
or structure may be continued." 
It is undisputed that the Petitioners, John Collins and June Collins, would 
have continued to use their properties as short-term rental units had the cease and 
desist order not been served upon them on March 26, 1996. As a general rule, 
cessation of a prior non-conforming use due to circumstances beyond the control of 
the property owner does not operate as discontinuance or abandonment of such 
nonconforming use. See e.g., Ocean Beach vs. Stein, 488 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1985); Andrew vs. King County, 586 P. 2d 509 (Wash. App. 1978); King County vs. High, 
219 P. 2d 118 (Wash. 1950). These cases hold that unauthorized conduct by a 
municipality or regulations temporarily preventing the particular use cannot be 
construed as an abandonment of the use by the owner. Whether a party discontinues 
or abandons a particular use depends upon the intention of the party affected. King 
County vs. High, at 119. 
Sandy City cannot arguably require a property owner to break the law in order 
to establish a nonconforming use. In fact, the ordinance itself (Sec. 15-24-2) provides 
that in order to establish a nonconforming use, the use cannot be illegal. (Add. 4 -5 ) 
The Plaintiffs in this case were clearly entitled to cease using the properties, as 
ordered, until the law was clarified by judicial process. The Petitioners' use of their 
properties (as alleged by Sandy City and as admitted by John and June Collins in 
1996) as short-term rentals prior to the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order by 
Sandy City in March, 1996 is sufficient to establish the uses as valid, nonconforming 
uses. Warner vs. Clackamas County, 824 P. 2d 423, 424 (Or. App. 1992); Polk County vs. 
Martin, 636 P.2d 952, 957 (Or. 1981); Township of Peacock vs. Panetta, 265 N.W. 2d 810, 
813 (Mich App. 1978). 
The test for the existence of a nonconforming use is whether the use was 
lawful at the time the preclusive legislation took effect. Warner, supra, at 424. The 
Utah Court of Appeals in Brown, supra, held that short-term rental use was a lawful 
use, not prohibited by the zoning ordinances in effect at the time. 957 P. 2d at 212-
213. The properties in question in this case were adapted for the specific use of 
short-term rentals. They were furnished and equipped by the Petitioners for this 
particular purpose and, until ordered to cease by the Respondent, Sandy City, they 
were used for this purpose. This use was discontinued temporarily by plaintiffs only 
because they were served with a cease and desist order by the defendant Sandy City7 
Corporation. The use of the properties as short-term rentals by the Petitioners prior 
to the issuance of the Cease and Desist Order (R. 28) was clearly an existing, legal 
nonconforming use and the plaintiffs are entitled to have the properties granted prior 
nonconforming use status. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Order of the District 
Court and order that the Petitioners, John Collins and June Collins, had established a 
valid, existing, non-conforming use for their real properties located in Sandy City 
prior to the enactment of prohibitive ordinances by Sandy City and that the 
Petitioners are allowed to continue the pre-existing, non-conforming use. 
Dated this day of May, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Franklin L. Slaugh 
Attorney for Petitioners-Appellants 
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Steven C. Osbora (3669) 
Kathleen & Jeffery (1652) 
Attorneys for Respondents 
10,000 Centennial Parkway 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 568-7170 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH •* 
JOHN COLLINS and JUNE COLLINS 
Petitioners, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
SANDY CITY BOARD OF : Case no. 980912601 
ADJUSTMENT and SANDY CITY 
CORPORATION, a municipal 
corporation, 
Judge Timothy R Hanson 
Respondents. 
This matter came before the above-entitled court on oral argument on August"1671999 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson on cross motions for summary judgment made on 
behalf of Petitioners and Respondents. Petitioners were represented by Franklin L. Slaugh; 
Respondents were represented by Steven C. Osbora. 
Based upon the memoranda, arguments, and exhibits submitted by the parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Third Judicial District 
1. There is no issue of material fact in this matter, and judgment can be issued as a matter 
of law for the reasons set out in the memoranda and oral argument of Respondents. 
2. Petitioners have not borne their burden to demonstrate that they are entitled a 
nonconforming use for any of the three subject properties. The Board of Adjustment decision 
was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal, and was supported by substantial evidence. 
3. The Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Petitioners' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is denied in respect to Petitioners' property at 1875 East Alia Panna Way 
in Sandy based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, due to Petitioners1 noHiaving appealed the 
trial court's decision in Third District Court case number 960905929CV, and for the following 
reasons: the home was not used as a short-term rental (less than 30 days) on March 27,1998, the 
effective date of the new ordinance prohibiting such use because Petitioners were complying with 
the City's earlier cease and desist order; and because Petitioners failed to carry their burden of 
demonstrating that when the property was used as a short-term rental; the Petitioners did not 
submit any evidence to show that the use was in conformity with the City's ordinances requiring 
that the use of properties in single family zones be by a "family" as that term is defined in the 
Sandy City ordinances. 
4. The Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Petitioners' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is denied in respect to Petitioners' property at 472 East 9400 South in 
Sandy based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, due to Petitioners1 not having appealed the trial 
court's decision in Third District Court case number 960905929CV, and for the following 
reasons: the home was not used as a short-term rental (less than 30 days) on March 27, 1998, 
the effective date of the new ordinance because Petitioners were complying with the City's earlier 
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cease and desist order; and because Petitioners failed to cany their burden of demonstrating that 
when the property was used as a short-term rental, the Petitioners did not submit any evidence to 
show that the use was in conformity with the City's ordinances requiring that the use of properties 
in single family zones be by a "family" as that term is defined in the Sandy City ordinances. 
5. The Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Petitioners' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is denied in respect to Petitioners' property at 9255 Maison Drive in 
Sandy based on the doctrine of issue preclusion, due to Petitioners1 not having appealed the 
1996 Board of Adjustment decision case number 96-31 to Third District Court, and for the 
following reasons: the home was not used as a short-term rental on March 27,1998,' the eflfective 
date of the new ordinance, nor was there evidence submitted that the property was ever used as a 
short-term rental. 
6. The Petition for Review is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits, no 
cause of action. 
& 
Ahn) 
DATED this _££_ day ofOetobfr, 1999 
BYTHEC0URT: 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON ' -' 
District Court Judge ^ C '" 
u*-*"r 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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NONCONFORMING USES & STRUCTURES 
CHAPTER 15-24 NONCONFORMING USES AND 
STRUCTURES 
15-24-1 Purpose of Nonconforming Use Provisions 
15-24-2 Continuing Existing Uses 
15-24-3 Construction Approved Prior to Ordinance 
15-24-4 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Extension, 
Discontinuance, Etc. 
15-24-1 Purpose Of Nonconforming Use Provisions 
It is the purpose of these regulations to control and 
gradually eliminate those uses of land or buildings, which 
although legal at the time of their establishment, do not 
now conform to the use regulations of the district within 
which they are situated. Such uses shall be deemed 
nonconforming uses. Likewise, these regulations are 
intended to control and gradually eliminate buildings 
which, although legal at the time of their erection, do not 
now conform to the height, bulk, and location regulations 
of the zone district within which they are situated. Such 
buildings shall be deemed to be nonconforming buildings. 
Any building or use which was permitted prior to enact-
ment of this Code, but which is designated by this Code 
as a conditional use, shall not be considered 
nonconforming and shall not be subject to the provisions 
of this Chapter. This Chapter is also established to 
control and gradually eliminate sites and lots which were 
legal at the time of their establishment but no longer meet 
the regulations of the district within which they are 
located. Such sites and lots shall be designated as 
nonconforming sites and lots. 
15-24-2 Continuing Existing Uses 
Except as hereinafter specified, any use, building, or 
structure, lawfully existing at the time of the enactment or 
subsequent amendment of this Code, may be continued, 
even though such use, building, or structure does not 
conform with the provisions of this Code for the district in 
which it is located. Except as otherwise provided by law, 
nothing in this Code shall prevent the strengthening or 
restoring to a safe condition of any part of any building or 
structure declared unsafe by proper authority. 
15-24-3 Construction Approved Prior To Ordinance 
A building, structure, or part thereof which does not 
conform to the regulations of the district in which it is 
situated, but for which a building permit was legally issued 
and construction started prior to the enactment of this 
Code, may be completed in accordance with such plans 
providing work has progressed continuously and without 
delay. Such building or structure shall be deemed to be 
nonconforming and shall be subject to the regulations set 
forth herein. 
15-24-4 Nonconforming Uses, Substitution, Exten-
sion, Discontinuance, Etc. 
Unless otherwise approved by the Board of Adjustment, 
a nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or 
changed unless the use is changed to a use permitted in 
the district in which it is located, and a nonconforming 
building shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered 
unless such alteration shall result in removing those 
conditions of the building which render it nonconforming, 
except as follows: 
(a) Substitution or Extension. 
(1) When authorized by the Board of Ad-
justment in accordance with this Code, a 
nonconforming use which is determined to be of a 
more desirable nature may be substituted for another 
nonconforming use or more closely meets the 
standards set forth in this code. 
(2) Whenever a nonconforming use has been 
changed to a conforming use such use shall not 
thereafter be changed to a nonconforming use. 
(3) Repairs and structural alterations may be 
made to a nonconforming building provided that the 
floor space of such building is not increased. (Refer 
also to requirements of Chapter 22, Site Plan 
Review.) 
(4) A building or structure lacking sufficient 
automobile parking space in connection therewith as 
required by this ordinance may be altered or 
enlarged provided additional automobile parking 
space is supplied to meet the requirements of this 
ordinance for such alterations or enlargement. 
(5) In the event a nonconforming building or 
structure is damaged or partially destroyed by 
calamity or act of nature to the extent of not more 
than one-half (!4) of its market value, the occupancy 
or use of such building structure or part thereof which 
existed at the time of such partial destruction may be 
continued or resumed provided that restoration is 
started within a period of one year and is diligently 
pursued to completion. In the event such damage or 
destruction exceeds one-half (Vi) of its market value 
of such nonconforming building or structure, no 
repairs or reconstruction shall be made, except in the 
case of residences or accessory farm buildings, 
unless every portion of such building or structure is 
made to conform to all regulations for new buildings 
in the district in which it is located, as determined by 
NONCONFORMING USES & STRUCTURES 
the Chief Building Official, and other requirements as 
may be imposed at site plan review. 
(6) Application for substitution, enlargement or 
extension of a nonconforming use as provided in this 
Section shall be made and considered in the manner 
set forth in Chapter 15-5, Board of Adjustment 
(7) A vacant building or structure may be 
occupied by a use for which the building or structure 
is designed or intended if so occupied within a period 
of one year after the use became nonconforming. 
(b) Cessation of Use. A use shall be deemed to 
have ceased when it has been discontinued for a period 
of one year or more, whether or not the intent is to 
abandon said use. 
(c) Nonconforming Lot. (See Section 15-5-3H) 
